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Abstract
We estimate semiparametrically the impact of the Mexican conditional cash
transfer program Oportunidades on the time mothers and older sisters spend taking
care of children aged under 3, using the randomization of a program placement and
the methodology in Lewbel (2000). Results support the existence of substitution
effects: mothers in treatment households are more likely to substitute for their
older daughters’ time to child care. As a result, daughters devote more time to
schooling and less taking care of their younger siblings. Overall, total household
time allocated to child care increases. These findings indicate that Oportunidades
not only fosters human capital accumulation through keeping teenage girls in school
but also through more and arguably better (mother provided) child care.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the economic case for public investment in Early Child Development
(ECD) has become increasingly forceful. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) argue that returns
to investments at early ages are higher than returns to investments later on in life on two
accounts. First, beneficiaries will have a longer time to enjoy the rewards from these
investments. Second, there are dynamic complementarities as early childhood learning
fosters and facilitates later learning. Therefore, redirecting funds towards the early years
is likely to entail Pareto improving efficiency gains.
The existing empirical evidence supports the notion that ECD is an important pre-
dictor of success throughout life. Both in developed and developing countries, poor ECD
outcomes —usually linked to poor family environments— are associated with inadequate
school readiness and poor school performance (Currie 2001); a lower earning capacity
(Currie and Thomas 2001); higher criminality (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Garces et
al. 2000) and lower levels of social integration. Children suffering from low ECD also
tend to have more children and provide poorer care, which contributes to the intergenera-
tional transmission of poverty and to economic inequality. A recent review by Grantham-
McGregor and coauthors (2007) estimates that there are at least 200 million children
younger than 5 in the developing world that fail to reach their potential in motor, cogni-
tive and socio-emotional development because of poverty, malnutrition, poor health and
deficient care.1
While the relevance of stimulation and the home environment on ECD is well estab-
lished empirically (Grantham-McGregor et al. 1997; Paxson and Schady 2007), caregivers
1See Gertler and Fernald (2004) and Fernald et al. (2006) for a description of the high prevalence of
low ECD outcomes amongst children in rural and semi-urban Mexico.
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may fail to provide adequate care and stimulation if they lack sufficient time, energy,
knowledge and money. Because these resources are often scarce in impoverished rural
environments, there is large scope for conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs —such as
the Oportunidades program in Mexico— to improve the circumstances in which children
from beneficiary families begin their lives. Even if CCT programs are not specifically
designed as ECD interventions per se, the monetary incentives and additional benefits
they provide —in the form of nutritional supplements, health checkups, and educational
talks— are likely to affect child rearing practices within a household.
In this paper, we investigate whetherOportunidades affects child care provision through
altering the allocation of time given over to child care amongst household members. We
exploit time use data on the randomized Oportunidades evaluation sample to semipara-
metrically identify the impact of the program on participation and on the extent of par-
ticipation in child care activities for mothers and sisters of under 3 year old children. We
focus the analysis on mothers and their older daughters as they are found to be the two
main child care providers in the household. Moreover and given the program design, the
older daughter is the household member likely to contribute the most to the total transfer
amount received by the household, conditional on her attending school. This strengthens
the case for greater economic incentives to enhance substitution effects in the allocation of
time devoted to child care between mothers and their older daughters. Both OLS, probit
and semiparametric estimates support the existence of such a substitution effect. We find
a 14% increase in mother provided child care in treatment households with teenagers 12
to 17 and children less than 3 years old. In turn, older daughters —ages 12 to 17— reduce
their child care participation by 40%, and increase their participation in school activities
by 9%. Overall, total household time to child care increases, which implies net increases
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in child care quantity.
The contribution of this study is twofold. Methodologically, we exploit the experi-
mental nature of the Oportunidades evaluation data to obtain a semiparametric estimate
of treatment on time allocation. We apply the Lewbel (2000) estimator for qualitative
response models to binary and ordered data, and argue that randomization of treatment
offers a unique setting in which to implement this recently developed estimator.2 In terms
of findings, the analysis provides evidence that Oportunidades increases human capital
accumulation both by keeping teenage girls in school and through more and arguably
"better" —mother provided— child care. Hence, linking benefits to school attendance can
simultaneously solve two related inefficiencies. First, an inefficiency in the levels of school
attendance and domestic work provided by older daughters. Second, an inefficiency in
the levels of child care provided in the household.3
The interest of economists in child care arrangements initially revolved around the
responsiveness of female labor supply and child care demand to job related child care
subsidizing policies (Heckman 1974; Michalopoulos et al. 1992; Averett et al. 1997).
Since Blau and Robins (1988), a number of studies have addressed family labor supply,
fertility and child care provision decisions within an intrahousehold time allocation frame-
work (Mueller 1984; Tiefenthaler 1997). Following the expansion of CCT interventions
worldwide, an increasingly extensive literature has developed around the impacts of these
programs on child health and nutrition —see Lagarde et al. (2007) for a review— and more
recently, on ECD (Gertler and Fernald 2004; Fernald et al. 2008; Paxson and Schady
2There are relatively few empirical applications of the Lewbel (2000) estimator. These include the
works of Cogneau and Maurin (2001) and Goux and Maurin (2005).
3Of course this is under the assumption that the pre-program levels of schooling and child care
provision were indeed inefficient, or in other words households were constraint in their choices.
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2010; Macours et al. 2008). This paper contributes to both literatures by shedding some
light on one of the mechanisms —namely, changes in household time allocation— through
which CCT programs can affect child care provision, and in turn, ECD.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the rural
Oportunidades program. In Section 3, we discuss the potential mechanisms at play behind
the observed effects. Section 4 describes the data and the sample of analysis. In section 5,
we present the Lewbel (2000) semiparametric estimator and discuss identification. Results
are presented in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
2 The Rural Oportunidades Program
Oportunidades began in 1997 under the name Progresa as a national anti-poverty program.
Over its first three years, the program extended benefits to almost all eligible families living
in rural areas. Starting in 2001, it expanded to urban areas and currently covers around
5 million families all over Mexico.4 In rural areas, Oportunidades determined household
eligibility in two stages. First, underserved communities were identified based on the pro-
portion of households living in poverty as defined in the 1995 population census. Second,
low-income households within these communities were chosen using a proxy means test.
Pre-intervention data to construct the index was collected on all households in eligible
communities through the Survey of Household Socioeconomic Characteristics (Encuesta
Socioeconómica de Hogares, ENCASEH). This process designated 52% of households in
selected communities as eligible for benefits.5
4www.oportunidades.gob.mx. See Skoufias (2005) for a review of the program design and impacts.
5Soon afterwards, a set of slightly wealthier households was included as eligible in a process called
“densification”. Many of these households however were not incorporated into the program until later
because of administrative delays. In order to not attribute treatment effects to untreated households, we
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All eligible households living in treatment localities were offered Oportunidades and
over 90% enrolled. Once enrolled, households received benefits for a three-year period
with the possibility of being recertified if all household members obtained the prescribed
preventive medical care, children attended school and mothers participated in educational
talks —called "pláticas"— on health, hygiene and nutrition.
Monetary benefits represent on average over 20% of total household income. They
are given bimonthly to the female head of the household in two forms. The first is
a nutritional grant given to all families to spend on more and better nutrition. It is
complemented with nutritional supplements and immunization directed to 0 to 2 year
olds, and to pregnant and lactating women; and regular health checkups. The second is
an educational grant given to each child younger than 18 and enrolled in school between
the third grade of primary school and the third grade (last) of secondary school. The
scholarship rises substantially after graduation from primary school and is higher for girls
than boys during secondary school. It is received conditional on children attending a
minimum of 85% of school days and on not repeating a grade more than twice.
3 Oportunidades and Child Care Provision
According to traditional household models, family utility is maximized when household
members allocate their time to the production of those commodities in which they have
a comparative advantage (Becker 1973). Women’s believed comparative advantage in
home time would thus explain part of the gender gap in market work participation and
female specialization in household activities, including the care of children. Even if the
traditional division of labor between genders is less and less patent in western economies,
will exclude "densified" households from the analysis.
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it continues to be firmly established in rural Mexico (INEGI 2000; Parker and Skoufias
2000). As an illustration, Figure A plots participation rates in child care by age and
sex in the Oportunidades evaluation sample. Child care is clearly a female activity: while
participation rates oscillate between 40 and 60% for adult women; men participation rates
are around 8%. A peak is observed for both men and women in their twenties. Note also
that female participation increases sharply from the age of 12.
These patterns in the allocation of time devoted to child care suggest a twofold analy-
sis. First, we frame the analysis within the "separate spheres" bargaining model of the
household developed by Lundberg and Pollack (1993). This model of distribution within
marriage differs from standard bargaining models (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and
Horney 1981) in that the threat point is not divorce —a rather implausible choice in rural
Mexico— but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage that reflects traditional gen-
der roles. The noncooperative equilibrium corresponds to a utility-maximizing strategy
subject to individual resource constraints within each spouse’s domain (sphere), taking
the other spouse’s strategy as given. In the current context, child care provision belongs
to the wife’s domain.6 Second, we focus on the allocation of time to child care by the
mother and her older daughter —aged 12 to 17— as they are the only two agents in charge
of the provision of household public good child care.7
Hence, we consider that the mother allocates her time between child care and leisure,
and her first daughter’s time between child care, schooling, and leisure. She chooses
the optimal levels to maximize her utility function —which is a function of total time
6The separate spheres bargaining model is consistent with the view that allowances targeted to
different spouses have different effects on the distribution of household resources —one of the premises on
which Oportunidades is based. It also allows for both spouses to enjoy household public goods.
7We assume that market child care services are unavailable in these disadvantaged rural communities.
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to child care, her and her daughter’s leisure, and her daughter’s schooling— subject to a
budget constraint, and to her and her daughter’s time constraints. We assume that the
noncooperative equilibrium allocations reached by the mother are the household’s final
equilibrium.8 This means that the implications of the unitary household model apply
within the mother’s optimization sphere. In this stylized household, the Oportunidades
intervention amounts to:
(i) an increase in the mother’s nonlabor income given the nutritional grant.
(ii) the provision of a minimum level of maternal care, given the required attendance to
the "pláticas", preventive health visits and the nutritional supplements.
(iii) a reduction in the price of schooling given the educational grant that the 12 to 17
year old daughter receives conditional on attendance. This implies that time in child
care is more expensive relative to time in school for daughters living in treatment
households.
The budget constraint in treatment households thus integrates the change in the price
of schooling and the unconditional nutritional grant. Assuming interior solutions, each of
the intervention components described above result in:
(i) an ambiguous effect on total maternal child care. If child care is assumed a normal
good, maternal child care provision increases with income controlled by the mother
through an income effect. However, because child care requires maternal time as an
input factor, increases in income might increase leisure, and reduce child care time.
8This may happen if transaction costs are high enough. As a matter of fact, the assumption is
supported by the data: household members outside the sphere (males) do not alter their (initially very
low) contribution to household child care time.
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(ii) direct increases in the total quantity of child care.
(iii.a) increases in the daughter’s time to school through the own-substitution effect be-
cause of the reduction in the price of schooling.
(iii.b) reductions in the daughter’s time allocated to child care through the own-substitution
effect, assuming the daughter’s child care and schooling times are substitutes.
(iii.c) increases in maternal child care time through the cross-substitution effect, given her
time and her first daughter’s are substitute inputs in the production of child care.
In all treatment households, maternal time allocated to child care will be affected
by the nutritional grant (income effect) and compliance with the program requirements
(preventive health visits and attendance at "pláticas"). However, cross-substitution effects
in child care time (effect iii.c) will only arise amongst those mothers whose daughters are
eligible to receive the educational grant. In the empirical exercise, we will exploit both
the random allocation of benefits and heterogeneity in mother’s offspring to disentangle
the cross-substitution effect from the composite of the other two effects (income effect
and compliance with program requirements). This composite effect will be a residual in
our empirical specification and its components unidentifiable.
4 Experimental Design and Data
We benefit from the fact that the Mexican Government was committed to a rigorous eval-
uation of the impact of Oportunidades using a controlled-randomized evaluation design.
Given budgetary and logistical constraints, the Government could not enrol all eligible
families in the country simultaneously and decided to phase in the enrolment of entire
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communities over time instead. As part of this process, the Government randomly chose
320 treatment and 186 control communities in seven states for a total of 506 experimental
communities.9 Eligible households in treatment communities began receiving benefits in
April of 1998; whereas eligible households in control communities were not incorporated
until November of 1999. In order to minimize anticipation effects, households in control
communities were not informed that Oportunidades would provide benefits to them until
two months before incorporation.10
In the empirical analysis, we use the Oportunidades rural evaluation data, or Eval-
uation Surveys (Encuestas de Evaluación, ENCEL), and the 1997 ENCASEH baseline
data. The ENCEL household surveys collected data twice a year on a host of topics:
demographics, assets, labor, consumption, etc. The May 1999 survey round collected
additional data on time use for all household members older than eight.11 By then, treat-
ment households had enjoyed benefits for over a year, while no control household had yet
received transfers. This allows us to obtain an estimate of the average treatment effect
on time devoted to child care.12
We construct a dataset of mothers older than 18 years of age living in eligible house-
holds in May 1999. We then match each mother to the characteristics and time allocation
of her older daughter —younger than 18 and still living in the household. We use infor-
9Behrman and Todd (1999) test for statistical differences in the distributions of a large set of observ-
able characteristics between treatment and control households to assess the validity of the randomization.
10Attanasio et al. (2005) find no evidence of anticipation effects among control households.
11Parker and Skoufias (2000) and Rubio-Codina (2006) provide further details on these data.
12Time use data was also collected as part of the November 2000 ENCEL round. As all eligible
households were already receiving benefits by then, we use this cross-section to test for differential effects
resulting from different lengths of exposure to the program benefits. We find increases in maternal time to
child care for mothers that have been in the program for longer (i.e. households in the original treatment
group). Results are available upon request.
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mation on time allocation to construct our main dependent variables. Specifically, the
question on time devoted to child care reads: "how many minutes did household member
i devote yesterday to the care of small children, the elderly or the sick?". To narrow the
scope of the question to the care of young children, we restrict the sample of analysis to
mothers of children younger than 3 living in households where there are no elderly or sick
members that might require care. Given the data available, this implies dropping out of
the sample households with: (i) elders older than 65 that did not engage in any paid or
unpaid work activity during the week before the interview; and (ii) members older than
6 that reported being unable to perform regular daily activities during the month prior
to the interview.13
The final sample consists of 4,036 mothers with children younger than 3 (see Table 1).
This represents about one third (34%) of all eligible households, as classified according to
the original classification scheme. Approximately, 26% of these women are also mothers
of a 12 to 17 teenage girl. Note that the proportion of mothers with different offspring
compositions is very similar in treatment and control households and remains similar to
the original (randomized) distribution —60% treatment and 40% control. This suggests
that the potential for sample selection and sample composition biases is negligible.
Panel I in Table 2 shows summary statistics of the dependent variables for treatments
and controls in May 1999. In the last column, we report a test of the equality of raw
means. Conditioning on having a teenager aged 12 to 17, mothers in the treatment group
have higher participation rates in child care than mothers in the control group although
the difference is not statistically significant. For first daughters aged 12 to 17, there is
13These represent, respectively, 6.6 and 1.6% of the households in the estimation sample and are bal-
anced across treatment and control groups. Parametric estimates are robust to keeping these households
in the estimation.
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a 6.8 points significant reduction in child care participation and a 7.9 points significant
increase in school participation given treatment. There are no significant differences in the
amount of time devoted to any of the activities considered conditional on participation.
In Panel II we report summary statistics on maternal and household characteristics
in May 1999; and on baseline household and community characteristics for the sample
of mothers under analysis. Mothers of children younger than 3 are around 30 and have
3.5 years of education on average. Less than 2% are the head of the household and
between 6% (control) and 9% (treatment) work for a wage. 41% of the mothers in the
sample are indigenous. On average, they have between 1 and 2 children younger than 3,
3 children younger than 7, and 1 child ages 8 to 17. The test of equality of means shows
no significant differences for any of the variables reported, as is expected from random
assignment. More importantly, there is not sufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis
of (statistically) equal offspring composition between mothers in treatment and control
groups during the intervention years. The only exception is the number of sons ages 12
to 17, which is significantly larger for treatment mothers.14
5 Semiparametric Estimation and Identification
Our objective is to identify empirically whether there have been changes in time allocated
to child care in the household as a result of the intervention, and understand the underlying
mechanisms at play. In this section, we exploit the exogenous variation introduced by
the random assignment of households to treatment and control communities, and the
14We cannot test the exogeneity of treatment by comparing baseline time allocation patterns between
treatments and controls due to lack of data. Randomization should however guarantee that they were
not statistically different.
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heterogeneity in household composition for this purpose.
5.1 Empirical Specification
In order to estimate the overall program impact on child care provision, we specify the
number of hours individual i spends on child care as:
y˜i = α0vi + α1Ti +
RP
r=1
βrxri + εi ∀i = 1, .., N (1)
where y˜i is the number of hours allocated to child care, Ti is a binary variable equal to
1 if i lives in an original treatment community and 0 otherwise; vi is the total transfer
amount the household has potentially accumulated since taking up the program; and the
xri are R individual, household and community characteristics (listed below). Thus, α1
identifies the average effect of treatment conditional on total transfers accumulated vi.
In other words, it identifies the counterfactual effect of being treated by the conditional
cash transfer program given some transfers vi received by the household. Notably, the
total average effect of the program on a given individual also depends on the amount of
transfer received by the household. Moreover, given the design of the program, the amount
of transfers is a function of characteristics xri. Remark also that, in such a specification,
interaction terms between vi and Ti are already taken into account since viTi = vi, by
construction. This will prove important in the semiparametric method whose validity
requires an exogeneity and partial independence assumption which would not be true if
some omitted interaction term appears in the error term εi.
Since the true number of hours is not directly observed, y˜i is a latent variable. For
simplicity, we model the observed variable yi in two different ways: (i) as a participation
dummy that equals 1 if i spends a positive number of hours on child care (y˜i > 0) and
0 otherwise (y˜i 6 0); and (ii) as an interval indicator that can attain up to k different
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values depending on the extent of time i devoted to child care (up to one hour, between
one and two hours, etc.).15
In a second specification, we interact the household treatment status with dummies
controlling for the mothers’ offspring composition to capture heterogeneous responses
across mothers living in different household environments:
y˜i = α0vi + α1Ti + α2S
j
i + α3TiS
j
i +
RP
r=1
βrxri + εi ∀i = 1, .., N (2)
where Sji equals 1 if the situation j is true. We consider two possible situations: (i)
mother i has offspring aged 12 to 17, and (ii) mother i has daughters aged 12 to 17. As
noted in section 3, cross-substitution effects in maternal time allocated to child care will
only arise amongst those mothers who live in treatment households (Ti = 1) and have
school aged children eligible to receive the educational grant (Sji = 1). We argue that the
coefficient on the interaction of treatment and offspring composition, α3, identifies this
cross-substitution effect. Given the child care participation patterns shown in Figure A
—i.e. females older than 12 are the main child care providers in these communities— we
expect any cross-substitution effect to take place between mothers and their 12 to 17 year
old daughters.16 In this specification, the coefficient on the treatment dummy, α1, is the
remaining effect of the program on the mother’s time to child care. It is composed by a
combination of the impacts coming from the nutritional grant (income effect) and from
compliance with the program requirements (preventive health visits and attendance at
15Even if time (in minutes) devoted to child care is a priori a continuous variable, the empirical
distribution has a discrete support on specific values, mainly hours and half hours.
16Moreover, because girls enrolled in secondary school receive the largest transfer amounts, teenage
girls are the household members that most significantly contribute to total household transfers (condi-
tional on secondary school enrolment).
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"pláticas") that affect all mothers in treatment households —regardless of their offspring
composition.
In the event of cross-substitution effects between mothers and first daughters, one
should also expect reductions in the older daughter’s participation and in the time she
spends caring for her younger siblings. To test this, we estimate equation (1) on the
(extent of) child care participation of first daughters —aged 12 to 17— of those mothers in
the sample described above.17 We additionally estimate equation (1) for first daughters’
school participation and for their extent of schooling and leisure time in order to obtain
a broader picture of their time allocation. We also estimate equations (1) and (2) on the
extent of leisure time for mothers.
5.2 Semiparametric Identification
Parametric identification of the parameters in equations (1) and (2) is possible using a
standard probit model —when yi is dichotomous— and an ordered probit model —when yi is
polychotomous— under the assumption that the error term of the latent variable follows a
normal distribution and the normalization of a parameter (α0 = 1, for example). However,
parametric identification relies too heavily on the chosen distribution of the error term. In
our setting, additional problems arise given that the error term is likely heteroscedastic for
two reasons: (i) we are testing for heterogeneous treatment effects across households with
different demographic compositions (i.e. α1 and α3 are different); and (ii) Oportunidades
sampled a large number of randomized communities (clusters), each consisting of relatively
few poor correlated households. As such, maximum likelihood will only be valid as the
17Recall that the number of daughters aged 12 to 17 is balanced between mothers in the treatment
and control groups (see Table 2). Note also that over 70% of the mothers in the estimation sample have
only one daughter 12 to 17 years old.
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number of observations in the cluster tends to infinity with the cluster unit fixed.
We have tested —and generally rejected— normality using Conditional Moments and
other standard tests. Results are available upon request. Consequently, and in order to
avoid the problems of specifying a parametric model, we estimate these discrete choice
models semiparametrically. Semiparametric estimation has the advantage of not imposing
any particular distribution (normal, logistic, etc.) on the latent variable errors and allows
them to suffer from conditional heteroscedasticity of unknown form. Khan and Tamer
(2009) provide an alternative distribution free estimator of such single index models.
However, we opt for the method of Lewbel (2000) because of the suitability of our data for
such purpose. Indeed, we can exploit the randomization of treatment in the data to justify
the partial independence assumption (Assumption A2 below), which is at the basis of the
method. Moreover, this assumption, has the advantage of guaranteeing that the error term
has a conditional mean which does not depend on interaction effects between partially
independent regressors and other regressors, thus avoiding some form of mispecification
error in the single index model.
Let us denote y, v and ε the column vectors of yi and vi and εi, respectively. X is the
n∗ (3+R) vector of right hand side variables except vi also called the "special regressor";
and β the column vector [α1, α2, α3, β1, ..., βR]. I(·) is an indicator function that equals
one if · is true and zero otherwise. Lewbel (2000) considers the binary choice model,
y = I{v+Xβ+ε>0} (3)
and the following assumptions, whose empirical validity will be discussed in the next
subsection:
A.1: Continuity: the conditional distribution v given X is continuous.
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A.2: Partial Independence: the conditional distribution of ε is independent of v given X,
Fε(ε|v,X) = Fε(ε|X).
A.3: Large Support: the conditional distribution of v given X has support [vL, vH ] that
contains zero: vL ≤ 0 ≤ vH . The support of −X 0β − ε is a subset of [vL, vH ].
A.4: Uncorrelated errors: E(εX) = 0, as in linear models.
Under assumptions A.1 to A.4, Lewbel (2000) shows that β can be estimated (with
root N consistency) by an ordinary least squares regression of y∗ on X, where
y∗ =
y − I{v>0}
f(v|X) (4)
and f(v|X) denotes the conditional probability density function of v givenX. If the distri-
bution of v is unknown, a nonparametric first stage is needed to estimate it. Alternatively,
an ordered data estimator can be used under more stringent conditions. For simplicity
and precision in the estimation, we will assume that v follows a normal distribution as
parametrized in Lewbel (2006).18
Lewbel (2000) shows that the proposed methodology extends to ordered response
models with K choices defined as:
y =
K−1P
k=0
kI{αk<v+Xβ+ε≤αk+1} (5)
where α0 = −∞ and αK = +∞. In this case, the transformation of the dependent
variable is written as:19
y∗ =
y
K−1 − I{v>0}
f(v|X) (6)
18A description of the implementation of the Lewbel estimator is available upon request.
19Lewbel (2000) also proposes an extension to censored data which consists of applying the ordered data
estimator repeatedly. More precisely, it involves: (i) defining a continuum of values for αk (thresholds),
(ii) obtaining a βˆk for each threshold defined, and (iii) efficiently combining the βˆk’s. Estimating as many
βˆ
0
k’s as values takes the dependent variable is an unnecessary computational burden. For simplicity, we
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Assumptions A.1 to A.4 imply that the conditional probability of success, pr(y = 1|v,X),
increases monotonically and varies from 0 to 1 over the support [vL, vH ] of v. As this is
admittedly very restrictive in empirical applications, Magnac and Maurin (2007) propose
an alternative assumption to A.3: a symmetry condition on the tails of the errors ε. Let
yvL = X
0β + vL + ε be the propensity of success for individuals with the smallest v, vL;
and yvH = −(X 0β + vH + ε) the propensity of failure for individuals with the largest v,
vH . Then, the symmetry condition can be expressed as:
A.5: E(X 0yvLI{yvL>0}) = E(X
0yvHI{yvH>0})
A.5 requires that the propensity of success yvL(or pr(y = 1|vL, X)) and the propensity
of failure yvH (or pr(y = 0|vH , X)) are identically distributed. If so, the Lewbel (2000)
estimator is unbiased. If symmetry of the tails is not satisfied, it is always possible to
choose conditional distributions for yvL and yvH —by trimming outliers in the distribution
of v— in such a way that symmetry is more likely satisfied (Magnac and Maurin 2007).
Moreover, Khan and Tamer (2010) have shown that the rate of convergence of the Lewbel
(2000) estimator can be slower than the parametric one and that numerical instability
can happen depending on tail distributions. We will thus devote some particular attention
to the support condition in order to apply this method and have tested the stability and
robustness of our estimator to variations in the trimming parameters.
5.3 The Special Regressor
Our chosen special regressor vi is the potential transfer amount that the household should
have accumulated at the time of analysis (May 1999) since it first received benefits. To
chose to categorize total hours into a limited number of intervals defined sensitively to the underlying
thresholds in the empirical distribution of hours, which as noted earlier suffers from considerable bunching
around specific values.
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construct vi, we first take the household’s composition and children’s school enrollment in
1997 (baseline) and move it forward to May 1999. Next, we compute the transfer amount
by applying the program benefit allocation rules since first take up, assuming no school
drop out and no grade repetition.20 In this subsection, we argue that the stock of the
potential transfers received by the household is a valid special regressor as it satisfies the
assumptions required for identification: continuity, monotonicity, partial independence
and large support.
First, the amount of accumulated potential transfers is a continuous variable (A.1)
and includes zero in the support (A.3). It is indeed positive for treatment households and
zero for control households.
Second, randomization of treatment at the community level guarantees that the treat-
ment dummy is independent of observables and unobservables, (εi, Xi) ⊥ Ti. In turn,
this implies that εi ⊥ vi|Xi (A.2) since the accumulated potential transfer is exogenous
by construction. As defined above, the cash transfers are vi = T ∗i f∗(Di97) where f∗(.) is
known, given by the design of the program and a function of a subset of baseline observ-
ables Di97 ⊂ Xi97 and T ∗i represents the length of time the household has been receiving
benefits by May 1999. We can also rewrite vi as vi = Tif(Di)ui where Ti is the randomized
treatment status and f(.) is a known function of a subset of May 1999 observables Di
(household demographics, school attendance and grade attended) and Di ⊂ Xi. Thus by
construction ui =
T∗i f
∗(Di97)
Tif(Di)
is an exogenous variable composed by two random elements:
20Note that vi and Ti differ in that different treatment households are eligible for different transfer
amounts depending on household size and composition (gender and age of children in school age) and en-
rolment status. Since vi in May 1999 is predicted projecting forward baseline household composition and
school enrolment, the required assumption for identification is that pre-program household composition
and school enrolment are exogenous.
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(i) the administrative difficulties that delayed the reception of benefits amongst beneficia-
ries; and (ii) any departure in household demographics and children’s school attendance
in May 1999 from the situation predicted using baseline information. Note that ui 6= 0
implies that vi is a nondeterministic function of some of the other regressors in Xi, as is
required for identification.
As noted, a testable implication of assumptions A.1 to A.4 and A.5 is the monotonicity
of the conditional probability of success pr(yi = 1|vi,Xi) over the support of vi. In this
setting, monotonicity amounts to assuming that: (i) the mother’s child care time and the
first daughter’s schooling time are nondecreasing functions of the cumulative potential
transfers (vi); and (ii) the first daughter’s child care time is a nonincreasing function
of vi. We have discussed the theoretical validity of these assumptions in section 3 and
"tested" its empirical validity (results available upon request).
6 Results and Discussion
We semiparametrically estimate the effect of Oportunidades on participation in child care,
and on the extent of participation in child care and leisure for mothers of children under
3 and for the older daughter —aged 12 to 17— of these mothers. For the first daughter,
we also estimate the program impact on participation and on the extent of participation
in school. For comparison purposes, we first report OLS estimates (Models A), then
probit —or ordered probit— results (Models B), and finally the semiparametric (Lewbel)
estimates (Models C). As our interest concerns the application of the Lewbel method,
we will focus the discussion on the semiparametric results.21 In all sets of estimates, we
21Note that the OLS, probit (or ordered probit) and Lewbel estimates are not comparable in magnitude
for various reasons. First, OLS estimates are likely biased given the binary and ordered nature of the
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trim observations with values of the special regressor vi in the top 7% of its distribution
to conform to the symmetry condition (A.5). We also trim extremely low values of
the conditional probability density function of vi as they imply, by construction, outlier
observations of the transformed dependent variable y∗. An analysis of the sensitivity of
the Lewbel estimator to trimming is available upon request.
All regressions include the following explanatory variables: maternal age, age squared,
years of education, ethnicity, head of the household status and whether she is a paid
worker; the first daughter’s years of education; baseline and contemporary household
demographic composition; baseline assets (dirt floor, electricity and farm size); and com-
munity characteristics (male agricultural wage in the community, distance to large urban
center, distance to secondary school, presence of pre-school and presence of junior high
school imparted via TV, or "telesecundaria" in the community). Estimates are robust to
the exclusion of these controls.
6.1 Maternal Time
Table 3 shows estimates of the impact of the program in May 1999. Panels I and II present
results for mothers’ participation in child care (binary outcome) and for their extent of
participation (ordered polychotomous outcome). For mothers, the extent of participation
in child care variable takes six different values: k ∈ {0, 1, ..., 5} = {no time devoted to
child care, up to one hour, between one and two hours, two and four hours, four to seven,
seven to thirteen}.22 Estimation results follow very similar patterns for both types of
dependent variables. Second, probit and ordered probit impose a normalization to one of the variance of
the errors for identification. Third, OLS, probit and ordered probit do not impose the normalization to
one of the coefficient on the special regressor as in the Lewbel method.
22Results are robust to a redefinition of these categories, defined to ensure enough power in each cell.
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outcomes.
Models 1A to 1C in Panel I show no significant effect of treatment on maternal par-
ticipation in child care when all mothers are pooled together neither parametrically nor
semiparametrically. However, when treatment is interacted with whether the mother
has offspring aged 12 to 17, the effect becomes positive and significant. Moreover, the
coefficient on having 12 to 17 year old children alone is negative and significant. We
interpret these findings as indicative of: (i) a cross-substitution effect between mothers
and their older children in child care provision; and (ii) Oportunidades attenuates the
cross-substitution effect. The semiparametric coefficient on having children 12 to 17 in-
teracted with treatment is 0.44 (Model 2C, Panel I) and the mean marginal effect is 7.15
percentage points.23 Given an initial participation rate of 51.4%, this results in a 13.9
percentage increase in participation in child care for mothers with children 12 to 17. We
further interact treatment with a dummy equal to 1 if the mother has a daughter —as
opposed to a child— aged 12 to 17 and find that the coefficient on this interaction is also
positive and significant (Model 3C, Panel I). Rubio-Codina (2010) reports a similar cross-
substitution effect between mothers and teenage daughters in time devoted to domestic
activities amongst Oportunidades beneficiaries.
Similar effects are observed on the extent of participation in child care. Mothers of
23For dichotomous outcomes, we compute the marginal effects on the estimated coefficients as: Mij =
4[1−Gˆ(−vi−xiβˆ)]
4xj =
4[1−Gˆ(ziβˆ)]
4xj = Gˆ(zˆ
0
i ) − Gˆ(zˆ1i ), where Mij is the effect of switching the jth binary
variable, xj , from 0 to 1 on the probability that yi equals one; and zˆ1i is the value of the index −vi− xiβˆ
when the j-th binary variable is set to 1, and similarly for zˆ0i when the value of j is set to zero. Gˆ(.) is
the estimated cumulative distribution function of the probability of yi given zi. We nonparametrically
estimate Gˆ(.) running the kernel regression of yi on zi. Results reported in the text were computed using
a Gaussian Kernel and 500 equally spaced points in the range of zi and are robust to larger numbers of
points.
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daughters 12 to 17 are more likely to increase the amount of time taking care of their
younger children given treatment (Model 2C, Panel II). As before, the coefficient on
treatment alone is negative and non statistically significant (Model 1C, Panel II). The
analysis on the extent of maternal leisure in Panel III shows opposite effects: mothers
with children younger than 3 and teenagers 12 to 17 enjoy less leisure given treatment.
This reduction is partly explained by increases in time to child care, to other domestic
activities and to compliance with the program requirements.
The qualitative evidence in Adato et al. (2000) endorses these findings. During
the summer of 1999, the authors conducted focus groups with 230 beneficiary and non-
beneficiary women to learn about their perceptions on the program. The authors report:
"Another reason that women’s time burden increases is because of the need to do work that
was previously done by children who are now attending school, particularly secundaria.
However, their mothers see this as worthwhile in order for their children to study. (...)
Although some women said that the father also does some of this work, more often it was
the mother.", (Adato et al. 2000, p. xiii).
6.2 First Daughter’s Time
Next, we turn our attention to the allocation of time by first daughters. Panels I and II
in Table 4 present the estimated program impact on first daughters’ participation in child
care and on their extent of participation. The latter variable takes four different values:
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} = {no time devoted to child care, up to one hour, between one and two
hours, more than two hours}.
Semiparametric estimates evidence a reduction of 7.1 percentage points in the first
daughter’s probability of participating in child care (estimated coefficient of -0.032, Model
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C in Panel I) or a 40.1% decrease. Significant reductions are also observed in terms of the
extent of participation (Model C in Panel II). A concern is that the observed reductions
in teenage child care participation are in fact driven by an increase in school attendance
of other siblings in primary school age. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is not testable as
almost all teenage girls with siblings younger than 3 also have siblings in primary school
age (6 to 11). It is well-known, however, that the program had little effect on primary
school enrolment (Schultz 2004), which makes this an unlikely driver of the results found.
About 65% of the first daughters in the sample that engage in child care activities
do not attend school. 3% of them report that they are not enrolled because they have
to help in the house.24 Moreover, conditional on school enrolment, another 3% report
having to take care of their siblings as one of the reasons why they miss school. Other
more frequent reasons are teacher absenteeism, illness, or care of the sick.
These figures are somewhat indicative that child care and schooling are substitute
activities. Not surprisingly, we semiparametrically identify a significant increase in par-
ticipation in schooling activities (attendance and homework) for first daughters aged 12
to 17 (Model C in Panel III). The estimated coefficient of 0.08 translates into a marginal
effect of 3.9 percentage points or a 9.3% increase in schooling, which is consistent with
the positive treatment impact on female secondary school enrolment reported in Schultz
(2004) and Parker and Skoufias (2000). The increase in the extent of time allocated to
schooling activities is, however, not significant. Moreover, we observe a significant re-
duction in the extent of leisure for first daughters (Model C in Panel V). This might
suggest that these girls reduce (or stop) their contribution to child care and instead, take
up schooling full time, as a result of the reduction in the price of schooling. Another
24Note, however, that a majority of teenage girls report not going to school because they do not have
enough money (51%), they do not like it (18%) or the school it too far (8%).
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possibility is that the intervention affects the allocation of teenage girls’ time to other
activities.25
6.3 Quantity and Quality of Care
In this subsection, we estimate equations (1) and (2) on total household hours devoted to
child care. We define total household hours to child care as the sum of hours each house-
hold member reports spending in child care and categorize the variable as k ={0,1,...,6}
={no time allocated to child care, up to one hour, one to two hours, two to three hours,
three to five, five to seven, more than seven}.
We should expect no effect on total household hours if mothers and their 12 to 17 year
old daughters are the only two household members taking care of the very young and if
mothers fully substitute for their daughters’ time. Conversely, if mothers —and possibly
other household members— increase time devoted to child care by more than the amount
previously devoted by teenage girls, α3 in equation (2) should be positive and significant.
A negative and significant α3 would imply a reduction in total household hours to child
care in treatment households. Table 5 shows a significant increase in the extent of total
household hours to child care in treatment households with children under 3 and teenagers
ages 12 to 17. This implies that Oportunidades fosters net increases in total child care
provided within the household.
The next natural question is whether mothers alone are more than compensating for
care time previously provided by their older daughter or whether other household members
are also contributing. Table 6 shows results from estimating (1) and (2) using the share
25As a robustness check, we re-estimate all previous regressions on the restricted sample of mums and
older daughters whose time information refers to weekdays. The estimated coefficients (available upon
request) are very similar —albeit less precisely estimated— to the ones reported here.
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of child care hours provided by household member m over total household hours as the
dependent variable. We consider the following "sets" of household members: mothers of
0 to 3 year old; other adult women living in the household; adult men; brothers aged 8 to
11 and 12 to 17; and sisters aged 8 to 11 and 12 to 17 of under 3 year old children.
Results are consistent with the premise that the mother is the household member
providing a larger share of child care in substitution of the older daughter and overall.
The coefficient on treatment interacted with girls (daughters) 12 to 17 on the share of
mother’s time is positive and almost significant at 10%. The coefficient on treatment for
the share of time devoted to child care for daughters aged 12 to 17 continues to be negative
and significant. Surprisingly, daughters aged 8 to 11 —who are the sisters of the 12 to 17
year old daughter— also seem to increase their share of child care provision in treatment
households. Because of the low participation rates for this subpopulation (around 3%),
we are inclined to think that this effect is driven by a few outliers.
Hence, and as long as we believe that the mother is more productive in the provision
of child care, these findings are suggestive that the program entails gains not only in
the quantity but also in the quality of the care given to the very young. The biology
and psychology literature have repeatedly acknowledged the mother as the best child
nurturer. Frequent breast-feeding and mother warmth are widely recognized as key care
practices (UNICEF 2001). Variations in the quality of maternal care are also proven to
produce lasting changes in stress reactivity, anxiety, and memory function in the offspring
(Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007). The works of Case and Paxson (2001) and Case et al.
(2001) are examples in the economic literature of the important role the biological mother
—as opposed to the stepmother— plays in the adequate investment in the child’s health
and education. Moreover, beneficiary mothers increase their knowledge on parenting
26
both through the interaction with medical staff at the health centers and by attending
the "pláticas" —the educational talks covering best health, hygiene and nutrition practices.
On the other hand, one could argue that environmental factors (the education of the
caregiver, for example) matter more than biological attachment. In the current context,
this would imply that older daughters are better caregivers as they are, on average, more
educated than their mothers. However, when we interact the treatment dummy with years
of education of the mother we find stronger substitution effects amongst more educated
mothers (results available upon request). This result confirms that the increase in quantity
of care is, on average, likely to go hand in hand with increases in quality.26
7 Conclusion
This paper provides robust semiparametric evidence that does not rely on ad hoc para-
metric models of the effect of the Oportunidades program on child care provision.
We have first shown that child care provision is a female activity in rural Mexico.
Next, we have argued that the intervention might lead to increases in the quantity of care
provided within the household, using the set up provided by a separate spheres bargaining
model and assuming the mother as the sole decision-maker. The nutritional supplements,
health checkups and educational talks ("pláticas") result in direct increases in the quantity
of child care mothers provide and young children receive. Moreover, the conditional-on-
attendance education grants result in a reallocation of time to "better paying" activities
given the change in the relative shadow values of household members’ time it entails. As
26We are currently using more recent rounds of the Oportunidades evaluation data to investigate
whether increases in maternal time to child care do improve child cognitive and non-cognitive develop-
ment. Because we have to rely on a somewhat different identification strategy, we consider this issue to
be beyond the scope of this paper.
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a consequence, increases in maternal care in substitution for care previously provided by
her older daughter were expected. These increases can arguably result in more and better
care if the mother is assumed to be a better caregiver.
We have applied the Lewbel (2000) semiparametric method and provided evidence
in support of such a mother-daughter substitution hypothesis. While mothers with 0
to 3 and 12 to 17 year old children are significantly less likely to participate in child
care, this behavior is reversed given treatment. In addition, older daughters devote their
freed up time to schooling. We also observe an increase in total household time given
over to child care in these households. These findings suggest that —by linking benefits
to school attendance— the Oportunidades program fosters human capital accumulation
both through keeping teenage girls in school, and through more and "better" child care.
Increased maternal care is likely to lead to better development in the early ages and
increased school readiness. Note that it would have been unfeasible to increase the levels
of child care provided by directly conditioning the reception of benefits to maternal time
allocated to child care, as it is not possible to monitor how much time mothers spend
with their children.
Interestingly, we have found no significant effect of treatment on child care provision
amongst mothers with no children older than 12 or on the pooled sample of mothers. This
suggests two things: first, the program mainly alters the household allocation of time de-
voted to child care through the reduction in the price of schooling (educational grant) and
the resulting mother-daughter cross-substitution effect. Second, the educational talks and
preventive care do not influence maternal child care provision as substantially as desired.
Gertler and Fernald (2004) point at the inadequate development of the "pláticas" as an
explanation of the inexistent program impacts on cognitive development. An alternative
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explanation could be that mothers in control communities also attend these talks, which
would confound the estimated treatment effect. However, it seems unlikely that house-
holds in control communities know about them, let alone travel to treatment communities
to attend. Consequently, and given the crucial role of ECD in long run individual and
societal welfare, CCT programs could re-consider introducing more intense parental and
community training activities oriented to promote child stimulation and early education.
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Figure A: Child Care Participation Rates by Sex and Age (May 1999) 
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Note: Households with children under 3 years old, no elder older than 65 not working and no 
sick individuals. Households deemed eligible for benefits according to the original 
classification scheme. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Sample of Mothers with Kids Younger than 3 Years Old 
 
All Treatment Control 
Mothers of Kids Younger than  3 4036 2571(63.7%)
1465
(36%)
Mothers of Kids Younger than 3 & Teenagers 12 to 17 1509 973(64.5%)
536
(35.5%)
Mothers of Kids Younger than 3 & Teenage Girls 12 to 17 979 636(64.9%)
343
(35.1%)
 
 
Notes: Sample of mothers 18 to 44 living in households with no elder older than 65 not working and no 
sick individuals in May 1999. Households deemed eligible for benefits according to the original 
classification scheme. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Raw Means between Treatment and Control Groups 
 
I. Dependent Variables (May 1999) N Mean SD N Mean SD t-stat
Participation in Child Care (All Mothers ) =1 2571 50.80 0.500 1465 50.99 0.500 -0.075
Participation in Child Care (Mothers of 12 to 17 Teenagers) =1 973 47.28 0.500 536 42.35 0.495 1.421
Participation in Child Care (Mothers of 12 to 17 Teenage Girls) =1 636 49.37 0.500 343 44.90 0.498 1.107
Participation in Child Care (First Daughter) =1 626 14.22 0.350 337 21.07 0.408 -2.127*
Participation in School (First Daughter) =1 626 45.69 0.499 336 37.80 0.486 1.826+
Hours in Child Care (All Mothers)† 1306 3.76 2.862 747 3.74 2.854 0.088
Hours in Child Care (Mothers of 12 to 17 Teenagers)† 460 3.41 2.681 227 3.36 2.681 0.202
Hours in Child Care (Mothers of 12 to 17 Teenage Girls)† 314 3.32 2.703 154 3.39 2.631 -0.247
Hours in Child Care (First Daughter)† 89 2.31 2.247 71 2.06 1.497 0.846
Hours in School (First Daughter)† 286 6.15 1.586 127 6.00 1.471 0.969
Total Household (Hh) Hours in Child Care (All Hhs)† 1353 4.04 3.086 783 4.03 3.028 0.047
Total Hh Hours in Child Care (Hhs with 12 to 17 Teenagers)† 500 4.05 3.276 248 4.16 3.183 -0.420
Total Hh Hours in Child Care (Hhs with 12 to 17 Teenage Girls)† 345 4.03 3.435 170 4.38 3.241 -1.082
II. Covariates
Current Maternal Characteristics  (May 1999)
Age 2571 29.66 6.418 1465 29.57 6.451 0.412
Years of Education 2534 3.55 2.720 1447 3.51 2.781 0.224
Hh Head =1 2537 1.89 0.136 1447 1.94 0.138 -0.094
Indigenous =1 2534 40.84 0.492 1445 43.04 0.495 -0.374
Working for a Wage =1 2534 8.72 0.282 1446 5.95 0.237 1.601
Current Household Characteristics  (May 1999)
Number of Kids 0 to 3 2571 1.25 0.465 1465 1.25 0.476 -0.382
Number of Kids 4 to 7 2571 1.05 0.798 1465 1.05 0.814 0.266
Number of Sons 8 to 11 2571 0.42 0.624 1465 0.38 0.605 1.500
Number of Sons 12 to 17 2571 0.37 0.697 1465 0.32 0.615 2.390*
Number of Daughters 8 to 11 2571 0.40 0.604 1465 0.40 0.614 -0.233
Number of Daughters 12 to 17 2571 0.33 0.644 1465 0.32 0.631 0.588
Years of Education Daughters 12 to 17 2571 1.38 2.589 1465 1.29 2.512 0.918
Baseline Household Characteristics  (October1997)
Number of Kids 0 to 3 2571 1.38 0.732 1465 1.41 0.740 -1.116
Number of Kids 4 to 7 2571 1.09 0.851 1465 1.07 0.847 0.571
Number of Teenagers 8 to 17 2571 0.75 1.046 1465 0.72 1.002 0.837
Number of Adults 18 to 54 2571 2.26 0.779 1465 2.26 0.827 -0.284
Number of Adults Over 55 2571 0.14 0.415 1465 0.13 0.381 0.657
Electricity  =1 2568 61.06 0.488 1464 62.09 0.485 -0.219
Dirtfloor =1 2563 71.91 0.450 1460 76.23 0.426 -1.503
Animal and Land (more than 3 ha) Ownership =1 2561 29.48 0.456 1463 31.99 0.467 -0.854
Baseline Community Characteristics  (October1997)
Pre-school =1 2514 91.45 0.280 1417 91.11 0.285 0.123
Junior High School Imparted via TV =1 2571 21.78 0.413 1465 25.26 0.435 -0.608
Health Center =1 2571 76.66 0.423 1465 82.87 0.377 -1.568
Distance to Closest Secondary School (Km) 2571 2.45 2.171 1465 2.67 2.782 -0.562
Minimum Distance to Large Urban Centre (Km) 2571 105.46 44.046 1465 101.52 47.534 0.716
Monthly Community Agricultural Male Wage (pesos) 2506 6.27 0.313 1395 6.29 0.304 -0.572
Treatment Group Control Group
 
 
Notes: +Significant at 10%; *Significant at 5%. Sample of mothers 18 to 44 living in households with 
no elder older than 65 not working and no sick individuals in May 1999. Households deemed eligible 
for benefits according to the original classification scheme. 
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Table 3: Maternal Participation in Child Care and Maternal Extent of Participation in Child Care and Leisure 
 
OLS PROBIT LEWBEL OLS PROBIT LEWBEL OLS PROBIT LEWBEL
Mod 1A Mod 1B Mod 1C Mod 2A Mod 2B Mod 2C Mod 3A Mod 3B Mod 3C
I. Child Care Participation  =1 Special Regressor (v) 0.345 5.843 - -5.314 -8.472 - -2.533 -1.879 -
    (Mean Dep Var = 0.51) (8.853) (22.617) - (9.951) (25.386) - (9.190) (23.580) -
Treatment (T) =1 0.014 0.020 0.007 -0.006 -0.033 -0.054 0.007 0.001 -0.003
(0.030) (0.077) (0.005) (0.030) (0.078) (0.053) (0.030) (0.077) (0.008)
Children 12 to 17 =1 -0.166** -0.428** -0.600*
(0.045) (0.120) (0.276)
T*Children 12 to 17 =1 0.095* 0.246* 0.435**
(0.037) (0.096) (0.128)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 -0.101 -0.259 -0.097
(0.071) (0.182) (0.085)
T*Daughters 12 to 17 =1 0.062 0.164 0.257*
(0.043) (0.109) (0.111)
II. Extent of Child Care Hours Special Regressor (v) 6.700 11.828 - -21.370 -6.995 - 1.093 6.041 -
     (Mean Dep Var = 1.94) (32.380) (22.201) - (36.543) (25.143) - (34.413) (23.769) -
Treatment (T) =1 0.037 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.030 -0.059 0.030 -0.008 -0.007
(0.107) (0.071) (0.002) (0.107) (0.070) (0.052) (0.109) (0.071) (0.007)
Children 12 to 17 =1 -0.344* -0.287** -0.369*
(0.144) (0.105) (0.149)
T*Children 12 to 17 =1 0.297* 0.217* 0.306**
(0.131) (0.090) (0.093)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 -0.180 -0.145 -0.065
(0.232) (0.160) (0.056)
T*Daughters 12 to 17 =1 0.094 0.098 0.142*
(0.138) (0.096) (0.061)
III. Extent of Leisure Special Regressor (v) 13.184 -2.596 - -21.415 -23.310 - 3.206 -7.842 -
      (Mean Dep Var = 7.54) (30.137) (19.251) - (35.890) (22.717) - (32.887) (20.842) -
Treatment (T) =1 0.001 -0.035 -0.004 0.031 -0.016 0.056 0.014 -0.028 0.004
(0.104) (0.064) (0.003) (0.105) (0.064) (0.052) (0.105) (0.064) (0.007)
Children 12 to 17 =1 0.250+ 0.164+ 0.493*
(0.139) (0.086) (0.218)
T*Children 12 to 17 =1 -0.316* -0.191* -0.457**
(0.126) (0.079) (0.118)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 0.059 0.041 0.100
(0.217) (0.135) (0.067)
T*Daughters 12 to 17 =1 -0.162 -0.086 -0.233**
(0.141) (0.088) (0.078)  
 
Notes: (N = 3710). +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses and clustered at the community level. Observations 
in the top 7% of Fv and with f(v|x) > 1*10-5 have been trimmed. All regressions include the following covariates: maternal age, age squared, years of 
education, ethnicity, head of the household status and whether she is a paid worker; the first daughter's years of education; baseline and contemporary 
household demographic composition; baseline household assets (dirt floor, electricity and farm size); male agricultural wage in the community at 
baseline, distance to large urban center, distance to secondary school, presence of pre-school and presence of junior high school imparted via TV, or 
"telesecundaria" in the community.  
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Table 4: First Daughters (Ages 12 to 17) Time Use - Child Care, Schooling and Leisure 
 
 
 
OLS PROBIT LEWBEL
Model A Model B Model C
I. Child Care Participation =1 Special Regressor (v) -6.994 -40.453 -
    (Mean Dep Var = 0.18) (12.140) (53.705) -
Treatment (T) =1 -0.085 -0.379+ -0.032**
(0.052) (0.220) (0.011)
II. Extent of Child Care Hours Special Regressor (v) -4.755 -38.338 -
    (Mean Dep Var = 0.40) (26.676) (53.429) -
Treatment (T) =1 -0.132 -0.356+ -0.032**
(0.112) (0.215) (0.011)
III. School Participation =1 Special Regressor (v) 35.239+ 100.092* -
    (Mean Dep Var = 0.42) (18.103) (50.348) -
Treatment (T) =1 -0.066 -0.185 0.008*
(0.077) (0.214) (0.004)
IV. Extent of Hours in School Special Regressor (v) 87.903+ 86.352* -
    (Mean Dep Var = 2.51) (46.025) (43.990) -
Treatment (T) =1 -0.137 -0.146 0.002
(0.194) (0.188) (0.002)
V. Extent of Leisure Special Regressor (v) 17.391 10.248 -
    (Mean Dep Var = 9.04) (62.764) (37.904) -
Treatment (T) =1 -0.180 -0.116 -0.013*
(0.239) (0.143) (0.006)  
 
Notes: (N = 758) +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses and 
clustered at the community level. Observations in the top 7% of Fv and with f(v|x) > 1*10-4 have been 
trimmed. All regressions include covariates (see Table 3). 
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Table 5: Total Household Hours in Child Care 
 
OLS PROBIT LEWBEL OLS PROBIT LEWBEL OLS PROBIT LEWBEL
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 3A Model 3B Model 3C
Special Regressor (v) 16.364 17.024 - -19.451 -3.856 - 13.278 11.820 -
(39.153) (21.341) - (44.630) (24.416) - (41.990) (23.157) -
Treatment (T) =1 -0.003 -0.029 -0.001 -0.039 -0.056 -0.059 -0.004 -0.035 -0.007
(0.129) (0.070) (0.002) (0.129) (0.069) (0.052) (0.130) (0.070) (0.007)
Children 12 to 17 =1 -0.290 -0.243* -0.342*
(0.189) (0.110) (0.138)
T*Children 12 to 17 =1 0.340* 0.220* 0.299**
(0.165) (0.090) (0.091)
Daughter 12 to 17 =1 -0.084 -0.107 -0.061
(0.297) (0.161) (0.054)
T*Daughter 12 to 17 =1 0.041 0.080 0.148*
(0.177) (0.097) (0.062)
Extent Household Hours in Child Care
 
 
Notes: (N=3710) Mean Dep. Var. = 2.16 hours. *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses and clustered at the community level. 
Observations in the top 7% of Fv and with f(v|x) > 1*10-5 have been trimmed. All regressions include covariates (see Table 3). 
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Table 6: Share of Child Care Hours Provided by Different Household Members 
 
 
Share
Mums
Share
Mums
Share
Other 
Women
Share
Other 
Women
Share
Men
Share
Men
Share
Sons 
 8 to 11
Share
Sons 
 8 to 11
Share
Sons 
 12 to 17
Share
Sons 
 12 to 17
Share
Daughters 
8 to 11
Share
Daughters 
8 to 11
Share
Daughters 
12 to 17
Treatment (T) =1 0.025 0.009 0.012 -0.013 -0.006 -0.008 -0.002 -0.007 0.008 0.005 -0.010 -0.026 -0.031*
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015)
Girls 12 to 17 in the Household =1 -0.072* -0.051 0.002 -0.011 0.006 -0.048**
(0.033) (0.046) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018)
T*Girls 12 to 17 in the Household =1 0.051 0.058 0.006 0.011 0.005 0.041*
(0.032) (0.045) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018)
Observations 4036 4036 476 476 4100 4100 1382 1382 1047 1047 1381 1381 988
Mean Share Child Care Hours 0.44 0.44 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.08
OLS
 
 
Notes: *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses clustered at the community level. All regressions include covariates (see Table 3). 
Share Household Member m =Total Hours to Child Care of Household Member m / Total Household Hours to Child Care. 
 
 
